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Abstract
Due to the increasing deployment of Deep Neural Net-
works (DNNs) in real-world security-critical domains
including autonomous vehicles and collision avoidance
systems, formally checking security properties of DNNs,
especially under different attacker capabilities, is becom-
ing crucial. Most existing security testing techniques for
DNNs try to find adversarial examples without providing
any formal security guarantees about the non-existence
of such adversarial examples. Recently, several projects
have used different types of Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solvers to formally check security properties of
DNNs. However, all of these approaches are limited by
the high overhead caused by the solver.
In this paper, we present a new direction for formally
checking security properties of DNNs without using SMT
solvers. Instead, we leverage interval arithmetic to com-
pute rigorous bounds on the DNN outputs. Our approach,
unlike existing solver-based approaches, is easily paral-
lelizable. We further present symbolic interval analysis
along with several other optimizations to minimize over-
estimations of output bounds.
We design, implement, and evaluate our approach as
part of ReluVal, a system for formally checking security
properties of Relu-based DNNs. Our extensive empirical
results show that ReluVal outperforms Reluplex, a state-
of-the-art solver-based system, by 200 times on average.
On a single 8-core machine without GPUs, within 4 hours,
ReluVal is able to verify a security property that Reluplex
deemed inconclusive due to timeout after running for
more than 5 days. Our experiments demonstrate that
symbolic interval analysis is a promising new direction
towards rigorously analyzing different security properties
of DNNs.
1 Introduction
In the last five years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have
enjoyed tremendous progress, achieving or surpassing
human-level performance in many tasks such as speech
recognition [19], image classifications [30], and game
playing [46]. We are already adopting DNNs in security-
and mission-critical domains like collision avoidance and
autonomous driving [1, 5]. For example, unmanned Air-
craft Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS Xu), uses
DNNs to predict best actions according to the location and
the speed of the attacker/intruder planes in the vicinity. It
was successfully tested by NASA and FAA [2, 33] and is
on schedule to be installed in over 30,000 passengers and
cargo aircraft worldwide [40] and US Navy’s fleets [3].
Unfortunately, despite our increasing reliance on
DNNs, they remain susceptible to incorrect corner-case
behaviors: adversarial examples [48], with small, human-
imperceptible perturbations of test inputs, unexpectedly
and arbitrarily changing a DNN’s predictions. In a
security-critical system like ACAS Xu, an incorrectly
handled corner case can easily be exploited by an attacker
to cause significant damage costing thousands of lives.
Existing methods to test DNNs against corner cases
focus on finding adversarial examples [7, 16, 31, 32, 37,
39, 41, 42, 51] without providing formal guarantees about
the non-existence of adversarial inputs even within very
small input ranges. In this paper, we focus on the problem
of formally checking that a DNN never violates a security
property (e.g., no collision) for any malicious input pro-
vided by an attacker within a given input range (e.g., for
attacker aircraft’s speeds between 0 and 500 mph).
Due to non-linear activation functions like ReLU, the
general function computed by a DNN is highly non-linear
and non-convex. Therefore it is difficult to estimate the
output range accurately. To tackle these challenges, all
prior works on the formal security analysis of neural net-
works [6,12,21,25] rely on different types of Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers and are thus severely lim-
ited by the efficiency of the solvers.
We present ReluVal, a new direction for formally check-
ing security properties of DNNs without using SMT
solvers. Our approach leverages interval arithmetic [45] to
compute rigorous bounds on the outputs of a DNN. Given
the ranges of operands (e.g., a1 ∈ [0,1] and a2 ∈ [2,3]),
interval arithmetic computes the output range efficiently
using only the lower and upper bounds of the operands
(e.g., a2− a1 ∈ [1,3] because 2− 1 = 1 and 3− 0 = 3).
Compared to SMT solvers, we found interval arithmetic
to be significantly more efficient and flexible for formal
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analysis of a DNN’s security properties.
Operationally, given an input range X and security prop-
erty P, ReluVal propagates it layer by layer to calculate
the output range, applying a variety of optimizations to
improve accuracy. ReluVal finishes with two possible
outcomes: (1) a formal guarantee that no value in X vi-
olates P (“secure”); and (2) an adversarial example in X
violating P (“insecure”). Optionally, ReluVal can also
guarantee that no value in a set of subintervals of X vi-
olates P (“secure subintervals”) and that all remaining
subintervals each contains at least one concrete adversar-
ial example of P (“insecure subintervals”).
A key challenge in ReluVal is the inherent overestima-
tion caused by the input dependencies [8, 45] when in-
terval arithmetic is applied to complex functions. Specif-
ically, the operands of each hidden neuron depend on
the same input to the DNN, but interval arithmetic as-
sumes that they are independent and may thus compute
an output range much larger than the true range. For
example, consider a simplified neural network in which
input x is fed to two neurons that compute 2x and −x
respectively, and the intermediate outputs are summed to
generate the final output f (x) = 2x− x. If the input range
of x is [0,1], the true output range of f (x) is [0,1]. How-
ever, naive interval arithmetic will compute the range of
f (x) as [0,2]− [0,1] = [−1,2], introducing a huge over-
estimation error. Much of our research effort focuses on
mitigating this challenge; below we describe two effective
optimizations to tighten the bounds.
First, ReluVal uses symbolic intervals whenever possi-
ble to track the symbolic lower and upper bounds of each
neuron. In the preceding example, ReluVal tracks the
intermediate outputs symbolically ([2x,2x] and [−x,−x]
respectively) to compute the range of the final output
as [x,x]. When propagating symbolic bound constraints
across a DNN, ReluVal correctly handles non-linear func-
tions such as ReLUs and calculates proper symbolic upper
and lower bounds. It concretizes symbolic intervals when
needed to preserve a sound approximation of the true
ranges. Symbolic intervals enable ReluVal to accurately
handle input dependencies, reducing output bound estima-
tion errors by 85.67% compared to naive extension based
on our evaluation.
Second, when the output range of the DNN is too large
to be conclusive, ReluVal iteratively bisects the input
range and repeats the range propagation on the smaller
input ranges. We term this optimization iterative interval
refinement because it is in spirit similar to abstraction
refinement [4, 18]. Interval refinement is also amenable
to massive parallelization, an additional advantage of Re-
luVal over hard-to-parallelize SMT solvers.
Mathematically, we prove that interval refinement on
DNNs always converges in finite steps as long as the DNN
is Lipschitz continuous which is true for any DNN with
finite number of layers. Moreover, lower values of Lips-
chitz constant result in faster convergence. Stable DNNs
are known to have low Lipschitz constants [48] and there-
fore the interval refinement algorithm can be expected
to converge faster for such DNNs. To make interval re-
finement even more efficient, ReluVal uses additional
optimizations that analyze how each input variable influ-
ences the output of a DNN by computing each layer’s
gradients to input variables. For instance, when bisecting
an input range, ReluVal picks the input variable range that
influences the output the most. Further, it looks for input
variable ranges that influence the output monotonically,
and uses only the lower and upper bounds of each such
range for sound analysis of the output range, avoiding
splitting any of these ranges.
We implemented ReluVal using around 3,000 line of
C code. We evaluated ReluVal on two different DNNs,
ACAS Xu and an MNIST network, using 15 security prop-
erties (out of which 10 are the same ones used in [25]).
Our results show that ReluVal can provide formal guar-
antees for all 15 properties, and is on average 200 times
faster than Reluplex, a state-of-the-art DNN verifier using
a specialized solver [25]. ReluVal is even able to prove
a security property within 4 hours that Reluplex [25]
deemed inconclusive due to timeout after 5 days. For
MNIST, ReluVal verified 39.4% out of 5000 randomly
selected test images to be robust against up to |X |∞ ≤ 5
attacks.
This paper makes three main contributions.
• To the best of our knowledge, ReluVal is the first
system that leverages interval arithmetic to provide
formal guarantees of DNN security.
• Naive application of interval arithmetic to DNNs is
ineffective. We present two optimizations – sym-
bolic intervals and iterative refinement – that signif-
icantly improve the accuracy of interval arithmetic
on DNNs.
• We designed, implemented, evaluated our techniques
as part of ReluVal and demonstrated that it is on
average 200× faster than Reluplex, a state-of-the-art
DNN verifier using a specialized solver [25].
2 Background
2.1 Preliminary of Deep Learning
A typical feedforward DNN can be thought of as a
function f : X → Y mapping inputs x ∈ X (e.g., im-
ages, texts) to outputs y ∈ Y (e.g., labels for image
classification, texts for machine translation). Specifi-
cally, f is composed of a sequence of parametric func-
tions f (x;w)= fl( fl−1(· · · f2( f1(x;w1);w2) · · ·wl−1),wl),
where l denotes the number of layers in a DNN, fk de-
notes the corresponding transformation performed by k-
th layer, and wk denotes the weight parameters of k-th
layer. Each fk∈1,...l performs two operations: (1) a lin-
ear transformation of its input (i.e., either x or the output
from fk−1) denoted by wk · fk−1(x), where f0(x) = x and
fk 6=0(x) is the output of fk denoting intermediate output
of layer k while processing x, and (2) a nonlinear trans-
formation σ(wk · fk−1(x)) where σ is the nonlinear acti-
vation function. Common activation functions include
sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, or ReLU (Rectified Linear
Unit) [38]. In this paper, we focus on DNNs using ReLU
(Relu(x) = max(0,x)) as the activation function as it is
one of the most popular ones used in the modern state-of-
the-art DNN architectures [17, 20, 47].
2.2 Threat Model
Target system. In this paper, we consider all types of
security-critical systems, e.g., airborne collision avoid-
ance system for unmanned aircraft like ACAS Xu [33],
which use DNNs for decision making in the presence
of an adversary/intruder. DNNs are becoming increas-
ingly popular in such systems due to better accuracy and
less performance overhead than traditional rule-based sys-
tems [24]. For example, an aircraft collision avoidance
system’s decision-making process can use DNNs to pre-
dict the best action based on sensor data of the current
speed and course of the aircraft, those of the adversary,
and distances between the aircraft and nearby intruders.
Figure 1: The DNN in the victim aircraft (ownship)
should predict a left turn (upper figure) but unexpect-
edly advises to turn right and collides with the intruder
(lower figure) due to the presence of adversarial inputs
(e.g., if the attacker approaches at certain angles).
Security properties. In this paper, we focus on input-
output-based security properties of DNN-based systems
that ensure the correct actions in the presence of adversar-
ial inputs within a given range. Input-output properties are
well suited for the DNN-based systems as their decision
logic is often opaque even to their designers. Therefore,
unlike traditional programs, writing complete specifica-
tions involving internal states is often hard.
For example, consider a security property that tries
to ensure that a DNN-based car crash avoidance system
predicts the correct steering angle in the presence of an
approaching attacker vehicle: it should steer left if the
attacker approaches it from right. In this setting, even
though the final decision is easy to predict for humans,
the correct outputs for the internal neurons are hard to
predict even for the designer of the DNN.
Attacker model. We assume that the inputs an adver-
sary can provide are bounded within an interval specified
by a security property. For example, an attacker aircraft
has a maximum speed (e.g., it can only move between 0
and 500 mph). Therefore, the attacker is free to choose
any value within that range. This attacker model is, in
essence, similar to the ones used for adversarial attacks
on vision-based DNNs where the attacker aims to search
for visually imperceptible perturbations (within certain
bound) that, when applied on the original image, makes
the DNN predict incorrectly. Note that, in this setting, the
imperceptibility is measured using a Lp norm. Formally,
given a computer vision DNN f , the attacker solves fol-
lowing optimization problem: min(Lp(x′− x)) such that
f (x) 6= f (x′), where Lp(·) denotes the p-norm and x′− x
is the perturbation applied to original input x. In other
words, the security property of a vision DNN being robust
against adversarial perturbations can be defined as: for
any x′ within a L-distance ball of x in the input space,
f (x) = f (x′).
Unlike the adversarial images, we extend the attacker
model to allow different amounts of perturbations to dif-
ferent features. Specifically, instead of requiring overall
perturbations on input features to be bounded by L-norm,
our security properties allow different input features to
be transformed within different intervals. Moreover, for
DNNs where the outputs are not explicit labels, unlike
adversarial images, we do not require the predicted label
to remain the same. We support properties specifying
arbitrary output intervals.
An example. As shown in Figure 1, normally, when the
distance (one feature of the DNN) between the victim
ship (ownship) and the intruder is large, the victim ship
advisory system will advise left to avoid the collision
and then advise right to get back to the original track.
However, if the DNN is not verified, there may exist one
specific situation where the advisory system, for certain
approaching angles of the attacker ship, advises the ship
incorrectly to take a right turn instead of left, leading to a
fatal collision. If an attacker knows about the presence of
such an adversarial case, he can specifically approach the
ship at the adversarial angle to cause a collision.
2.3 Interval Analysis
Interval arithmetic studies the arithmetic operations on
intervals rather than concrete values. As discussed above,
since (1) the DNN safety property checking requires set-
ting input features within certain ranges and checking the
output ranges for violations, and (2) the DNN computa-
tions only include additions and multiplications (linear
transformations) and simple nonlinear operations (e.g.,
ReLUs), interval analysis is a natural fit to our problem.
We provide some formal definitions of interval extensions
of functions and their properties below. We use these
definitions in Section 4 for demonstrating the correctness
of our algorithm.
Formally, let x denote a concrete real value and X :=
[X ,X ] denote an interval, where X is the lower bound,
and X is the upper bound. An interval extension of a
function f (x) is a function of intervals F such that, for
any x ∈ X , F([x,x]) = f (x). The ideal interval extension
F(X) approaches the image of f , f (X) := { f (x) : x ∈ X}.
Let f (X1,X2, ...,Xd) := { f (x1,x2, ...,xd) : x1 ∈ X1,x2 ∈
X2, ...,xd ∈ Xd} where d is the number of input dimen-
sions. An interval valued function F(X1,X2, ...,Xd) is
inclusion isotonic if, when Yi ⊆ Xi for i= 1, ...,d, we have
F(Y1,Y2, ...,Yd)⊆ F(X1,X2, ...,Xd)
An interval extension function F(X) that is defined on
an interval X0 is said to be Lipschitz continuous if there is
some number L such that:
∀X ⊆ X0,w(F(X))≤ L ·w(X)
where w(X) is the width of interval X , and X here denotes
X = (X1,X2, ...,Xd), a vector of intervals [45].
3 Overview
Interval analysis is a natural fit to the goal of verifying
safety properties in neural networks as we have discussed
in Section 2.3. Naively, by setting input features as inter-
vals, we could follow the same arithmetic performed in
the DNN to compute the output intervals. Based on the
output intervals, we can verify if the input perturbations
will finally lead to violations or not (e.g., output intervals
go beyond a certain bound). Note that, lack of violations
indicates the safety property is verified to be safe due to
over-approximations.
However, naively computing output intervals in this
way suffers from high errors as it computes extremely
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Figure 2: Running example to demonstrate our tech-
niques.
loose bounds due to the dependency problem. In particu-
lar, it can only get a highly conservative estimation of the
output range, which is too wide to be useful for checking
any safety property. In this section, we first demonstrate
the dependency problem with a motivating example using
naive interval analysis. Next, based on the same example,
we describe how the techniques described in this paper
can mitigate this problem.
A working example. We use a small motivating exam-
ple shown in Figure 2 to illustrate the inter-dependency
problem and our techniques in dealing with this problem
in Figure 3.
Let us assume that the sample NN is deployed in an un-
manned aerial vehicle taking two inputs (1) distance from
the intruder and (2) intruder approaching angle, while
producing the steering angle as output. The NN has five
neurons arranged in three layers. The weights attached to
each edge is also shown in Figure 3 .
Assume that we aim to verify if the predicted steering
angle is safe by checking a property that the steering angle
should be less than 20 if the distance from the intruder is
in [4,6] and the possible angle of approaching intruder is
in [1,5].
Let x denote the distance from an intruder and y de-
note the approaching angle of the intruder. Essentially,
given x ∈ [4,6] and y ∈ [1,5], we aim to assert that
f (x,y) ∈ [−∞,20]. Figure 3a illustrates the naive inter-
val propagation in this NN. By performing the interval
multiplications and additions, along with applying the
ReLU activation functions, we get the output interval to
be [0,22]. Note that this is an overestimation because the
upper bound 22 cannot be achieved: it can only appear
when the left hidden neuron outputs 27 and the right one
outputs 5. However, for the left hidden neuron to output
27, the conditions x = 6 and y = 5 have to be satisfied.
Similarly, for the right hidden neuron to output 5, the
conditions x = 4 and y = 1 have to be satisfied. These
two conditions are contradictory and therefore cannot be
[4,6] [1,5]
12 13
1 ­1
[5,11][11,27]
[11,27] [5,11]
[0,22] [2,16]U[6,20]=[2,20]
[4,6] [1,5]
12 13
1 ­1
[5,11][11,27]
[11,27] [5,11]
[6,16]
[2x+3y, 2x+3y]  [x+y,x+y] 
[x+2y,x+2y] 
x y
[4,6]
12 13
1 ­1
[1,3][3,5]
 
[11,21] 
[17,27] 
 
[5,9] 
[7,11] 
(a) Naive interval propagation (b) Symbolic interval propagation (c) Iterative bisection and refinement
Figure 3: Examples showing (a) naive interval extension where the output interval is very loose as it ignores the
inter-dependency of the input variables, (b) using symbolic interval analysis to keep track of some of the dependencies,
and (c) using bisection to reduce the over-approximation error.
satisfied simultaneously and therefore the final output 22
can never appear. This effect is known as the dependency
problem [45].
As we have defined that a safe steering angle must
be less than or equal to 20, we cannot guarantee non-
existence of violations, as the steering angle can have a
value as high as 22 according to the naive interval propa-
gation described above.
Symbolic interval propagation. Figure 3b demonstrates
how we maintain the symbolic intervals to preserve as
much dependency information as we can while propa-
gating the bounds through the NN layers. In this paper,
we only keep track of linear symbolic bounds and con-
cretize the bounds when it is not possible to maintain
accurate linear bounds. We compute the final output in-
tervals using the corresponding symbolic equations. Our
approach helps in significantly cutting down the over-
approximation errors.
For example, in the current example, the intermediate
neurons update their symbolic lower and upper bounds to
be 2x+3y and x+y, denoting the operations performed by
the previous linear transformations (taking the dot product
of the input and weight parameters). As we also know
2x+ 3y > 0 and x+ y > 0 for the given input range x ∈
[4,6] and y ∈ [1,5], we can safely propagate the symbolic
intervals through the ReLU activation functions.
In the final layer, the propagated bound will be [x+
2y,x+ 2y], where we can finally compute the concrete
interval [6,16]. This is tighter than the naive baseline
interval [0,22] and can be used to verify the property that
the steering angle will be less than 20.
In summary, symbolic interval propagation explicitly
represents the intermediate computations of each neuron
in terms of the symbolic intervals that encode the inter-
dependency of the inputs to minimize overestimation.
However, in more complex cases, there might be inter-
mediate neurons with symbolic bounds whose possible
values can potentially be negative. For such cases, we
can no longer keep the symbolic interval using a linear
equation while passing it through a ReLU. Therefore, we
concretize their upper and lower bounds and ignore their
dependencies. To minimize the errors caused by such
cases, we introduce another optimization, iterative refine-
ment, as described below. As shown in Section 7, we
can achieve very tight bounds by combining these two
techniques.
Iterative refinement. Figure 3c illustrates another opti-
mization that we introduce for mitigating the dependency
problem. Here, we leverage the fact that the dependency
error for Lipschitz continuous functions decreases as the
width of intervals decreases (any DNN with a finite num-
ber of layers is Lipschitz continuous as shown in Sec-
tion 4.2). Therefore, we can bisect the input interval by
evenly dividing the interval into the union of two consec-
utive sub-intervals and reduce the overestimation. The
output bound can thus be tightened as shown in the ex-
ample. The interval becomes [2,20], which proves the
non-existence of the violation. Note that we can iteratively
refine the output interval by repeated splitting of the input
intervals. Such operations are highly parallelizable as
the split sub-intervals can be checked independently (Sec-
tion 7). In Section 4, we provide a proof that the iterative
refinement can effectively reduces the width of the output
range to an arbitrary precision within finite steps for any
Lipschitz continuous DNN.
4 Proof of Correctness
Section 3 demonstrates the basic idea of naive interval
extension and the optimization of iterative refinement.
In this section, we give the detailed proof about the cor-
rectness of interval analysis/estimation on DNNs, also
known as interval extension estimation, and the conver-
gence of iterative refinement. The proofs are based on
two aforementioned properties of neural networks: inclu-
sion isotonicity and Lipschitz continuity. In general, the
correctness guarantee of interval extension holds for most
finite DNNs while the convergence guarantee requires
Lipschitz continuity. In the following, we give the proof
of correctness for two most important techniques we use
throughout the paper, but the proof is generic and works
for our other optimizations such as symbolic interval anal-
ysis, influence analysis and monotonicity as described in
Section 5.
Let f denote an NN and F denote its naive interval
extension. We define the naive interval extension as a
function F(X) that (1) satisfies for all x ∈ X ,F([x,x]) =
f (x) and (2) that only involves naive interval operations
during interval variable representations. For all the other
types of interval extensions, they can be easily analyzed
based on the following proof.
4.1 Correctness of Overestimation
We are going to demonstrate that, for the naive interval
extension of f , F always overestimates the theoretically
tightest output range f . According to our definition of
inclusion isotonicity described in Section 2, it suffices
to prove that the naive interval extension of an NN is
inclusion isotonic. Note that we only consider neural
networks with ReLUs as activation functions for the fol-
lowing proof, but the proof can be easily extended to other
popular activation functions like tanh or sigmoid.
First, we need to demonstrate that F is inclusion iso-
tonic. Because ReLU is monotonic, so we can sim-
ply consider its interval extension to be ReluI(X) :=
[max(0,X),max(0,X)]. Therefore, ∀Y ⊂ X , we have
max(0,X) ≤ max(0,Y ) and max(0,X) ≥ max(0,Y ) so
that its interval extension Relu(Y )⊆ Relu(X). Most com-
mon activation functions are inclusion isotonic. We refer
interested readers to [45] for a list of common functions
that are inclusion isotonic.
We note that f (X) is a composition of activation func-
tions and linear functions. And we also see that linear
functions, as well as common activation functions, are
inclusion isotonic [45]. Because any combinations of in-
clusion isotonic functions are still inclusion isotonic, thus,
we have that the interval representation F(X) of f (X) is
inclusion isotonic.
Next, we show for arbitrary X = (X1, . . . ,Xd), that:
f (X)⊆ F(X)
Applying the previously shown inclusion isotonicity prop-
erties of F(X), we get:
f (X1, . . . ,Xd) =
⋃
(x1,...,xd)∈X
{ f (x1, . . . ,xd)}
=
⋃
(x1,...,xd)∈X
F([x1,x1], . . . , [xd ,xd ])
Now, for any such (x1, . . . ,xd) ∈ X , we have
F([x1,x1], . . . , [xd ,xd ]) ⊆ F(X1, . . . ,Xd), since
([x1,x1], . . . , [xd ,xd ]) ⊆ (X1, . . . ,Xd), and F(X) is
inclusion isotonic. We thus get:⋃
(x1,...,xd)∈X
F([x1,x1], . . . , [xd ,xd ])⊆ F(X1, . . . ,Xd) (1)
which is exactly the desired result.
Now, we get the result shown in Equation 1 that for
all input X , the interval extension of f , F(X), always
contains the true codomain (theoretically tightest bound)
for f (X).
4.2 Convergence in Finite Number of Splits
Now we see that the naive interval extension of f is an
overestimation of true output. Next, we show that iter-
atively splitting input is an effective way to refine and
reduce such overestimated error. Empirically, we can see
finite number of splits allow us to approximate f with F
with arbitrary accuracy, this is guaranteed by Lipschitz
continuity property of NNs.
First, we need to prove F is Lipschitz continuous. It
is straightforward to show that many common activation
functions are Lipschitz continuous [45]. Here, we show
the natural interval extension ReluI is Lipschitz contin-
uous, with a Lipschitz constant L := 1. We see, for any
input interval X :
w(ReluI(X)) = max(X ,0)−max(X ,0)
≤ max(X ,0)−X ≤ X−X = w(X)
Thus, the interval extension ReluI of ReLU is Lipschitz
continuous. As the NN is a finite composition of Lips-
chitz continuous functions, its interval extension F is still
Lipschitz continuous as well [45].
Now we demonstrate that by splitting input X into N
smaller pieces and taking the union of their corresponding
outputs, we can achieve a refined output estimation with
at least N times smaller overestimation error. We define
an N-split uniform subdivision of input X = (X1, ...,Xd)
as a collection of sets Xi, j:
Xi, j := [Xi+( j−1)w(Xi)N ,Xi+ j
w(Xi)
N
]
where i ∈ 1, . . . ,d and j ∈ 1, . . .N. We note that this is
exactly a partition of each Xi into N pieces of equiva-
lent width such that ∀i, j, w(Xi, j) = w(Xi)/N and Xi =⋃N
j=1 Xi, j. We then define a refinement of F over X with
N splits as:
F(N)(X) :=
N⋃
i=1
F(X1,i, . . . ,Xd,i)
Finally, we define the range of overestimated error
created by naive interval extension on an NN after N-split
refinement as w(E(N)(X)):
w(E(N)(X)) := w(F(N)(X))−w( f (X))
Because F is Lipschitz continuous, Theorem 6.1 in
[45] gives us the following result:
w(E(N)(X))≤ 2L ·w(X)/N (2)
Equation 2 shows the error width of the N-split refine-
ment w(E(N)(X)) converges to 0 linearly as we increase
N. That is, we can achieve arbitrary accuracy when using
N-split refinement to approximate f (X) with sufficiently
large N.
5 Methodology
Figure 4 shows the main workflow along with the differ-
ent components of ReluVal. Specifically, ReluVal uses
symbolic interval analysis to get a tight estimation of the
output ranges based on the input ranges. It declares a secu-
rity property as verified if the estimated output interval is
tight enough to satisfy the property. If the output interval
shows potential existence of violations, ReluVal randomly
samples a few points from the interval and check for vio-
lations. If any adversarial case is detected, i.e., a concrete
input violating the security property, it outputs this as
a counterexample. Otherwise, ReluVal uses iterative in-
terval refinement to further tighten the output interval to
approach the theoretically tightest bound and repeats the
same process described above. Once the number of itera-
tions reaches a preset threshold, ReluVal outputs timeout
denoting it cannot verify the security property.
Figure 4: Workflow of ReluVal in checking security prop-
erty of DNN.
As discussed in Section 3, simple interval extension
only obtains loose/conservative intervals due to input de-
pendency problem. Below, we describe the details of the
optimizations we propose to further tighten the bounds.
5.1 Symbolic Interval Propagation
Symbolic Interval propagation is one of our core contri-
butions to mitigate the input dependency problem and
tighten the output interval estimation. If a DNN would
only consist of linear transformations, keeping symbolic
equation throughout the intermediate computations of a
DNN can perfectly eliminate the input dependency errors.
However, as shown in Section 3, passing an equa-
tion through a ReLU node essentially involves dropping
the equation and replacing it with 0 if the equation can
evaluate to a negative value for the given input range.
Therefore, we keep the lower and upper bound equations
(Equp,Eqlow) for as many neurons as we can and only
concretize as needed.
Algorithm 1 Symbolic interval analysis
Inputs: network← tested neural network
input← input interval
1: Initialize eq = (equp,eqlow);
2: // cache mask matrix needed in backward propagation
3: R[numLayer][layerSize];
4: // loops for each layer
5: for layer = 1 to numlayer do
6: // matmal equations with weights as interval;
7: eq= weight
⊗
eq;
8: // update the output ranges for each node
9: if layer != lastLayer then
10: for i = 1 to layerSize[layer] do
11: if equp[i]≤ 0 then
12: // Update to 0
13: R[layer][i]=[0,0]; . d(relu(x))dx = [0,0]
14: equp[i] = eqlow[i] = 0;
15: else if eqlow[i]≥0 then
16: // Keep dependency
17: R[layer][i]=[1,1]; . d(relu(x))dx = [1,1]
18: else
19: // Concretization
20: R[layer][i]=[0,1]; . d(relu(x))dx = [0,1]
21: eqlow[i] = 0
22: if equp[i]≤ 0 then
23: equp[i] = equp[i];
24: else
25: output = {lower, upper};
26: return R, output;
Algorithm 1 elaborates the procedure of propagating
symbolic intervals/equations during the interval computa-
tion of a DNN. We describe the core components and the
details of this technique below.
Constructing symbolic intervals. Given a particular
neuron A, (1) If A is in the first layer, we can compute the
symbolic bounds as:
EqAup(X) = Eq
A
low(X) = w1x1+ ...+wdxd
where x1, ...,xd are the inputs and w1, ...,wd are the
weights of the corresponding edges. (2) If A belongs to
the intermediate layer, we initialize the symbolic intervals
of A’s output as:
EqAup(X) =W+Eq
Aprev
up (X)+W−Eq
Aprev
low (X)
EqAlow(X) =W+Eq
Aprev
low (X)+W−Eq
Aprev
up (X)
where EqAprevup and Eq
Aprev
low are the equations from last layer.
W+ and W− denote the positive and negative weights of
current layer respectively. The output will be [w+a,w+b]
for multiplying positive weight parameters w+ with an
interval [a,b]. For the negative weight parameters, the
output will be flipped in terms of a and b, i.e., [w−b,w−a].
Concretization. While passing a symbolic equation
through the ReLU nodes, we evaluate the concrete value
of the equation’s upper and lower bounds Equp(X) and
Eqlow(X). If Eqlow(X)> 0, then we pass the lower equa-
tion on to the next layer. Otherwise, we concretize it to
be 0. Similarly, if Equp(X)> 0, we pass the upper equa-
tion on to the next layer. Otherwise, we concretize it as
Equp(X).
Correctness. We first clarify three different output in-
tervals: (1) theoretically tightest bound f (X), (2) naive
interval extension bound F(X), and (3) symbolic bound
[Eqlow(X),Equp(X)]. We prove that the symbolic bound
is a superset of theoretically tightest bound and a subset
of naive interval extension bound:
f (X)⊆ [Eqlow(X),Equp(X)]⊆ F(X) (3)
For a given input range propagated to the output layer,
it will involve both computing linear transformations and
applying ReLUs. Symbolic interval analysis keeps the
accurate bounds for linear transformations and uses con-
cretization to handle non-linearity. Compared to theoreti-
cally tightest bound, the only approximation introduced
during the symbolic propagation process is due to con-
cretization while handling ReLU nodes, which is an over-
approximation as shown before. Naive interval extension,
on the other hand, is a degenerate version of symbolic
interval analysis where it does not keep any symbolic
constraints. Therefore, symbolic interval analysis over-
approximates the theoretically tightest bound and, in turn,
is over-approximated by naive interval extension as shown
in Equation 3.
5.2 Iterative Interval Refinement
While symbolic interval analysis helps in computing rel-
atively tight bounds, the estimated output intervals for
complex networks may still not be tight enough for veri-
fying properties, especially when the input intervals are
comparably large and thus resulting in many concretiza-
tions. As discussed above in Section 5, for such cases, we
resort to another technique, iterative interval refinement.
In addition, we also propose two other optimizations, in-
fluence analysis and monotonicity, which further refine
the estimated output ranges based on iterative interval
refinement.
Baseline iterative refinement. In Section 4, we have
proved that theoretically tightest bound could be ap-
proached by repeatedly splitting the input intervals. There-
fore, we perform iterative bisections on each input interval
X1, ...,Xn until the output interval is tight enough to meet
the security property, or time out, as shown in Figure 4.
The iterative bisection process can be represented as a
bisection tree as shown in Figure 5. Each bisection on one
input yields two children denoting two consecutive sub-
intervals, the union of which computes the output bound
for their parent. Here, X (i) j means the jth input interval
with split depth i. After one bisection on X (i) j , it creates
two children: X (i+1)2 j−1 = {X1, ..., [Xi, Xi+Xi2 ], ...,Xd} and
X (i+1)2 j = {X1, ..., [Xi+Xi2 ,Xi], ...,Xd}.
To identify the existence of any adversarial example in
the bisected input ranges, we sample a few input points
(the current default is the middle point of each range) and
verify if the concrete output leads to any property viola-
tion. If so, we output the adversarial example, mark this
sub-interval as definitely containing adversarial examples,
and conclude the analysis for this specific sub-interval.
Otherwise, we repeat the symbolic interval analysis pro-
cess for the sub-intervals. This default configuration is
tailored towards deriving a conclusive answer of “secure”
or “insecure” for the entire input intervals. Users of Re-
luVal can configure it to further split an insecure interval
to potentially discover secure sub-intervals within the
insecure interval.
Optimizing iterative refinement. We develop two other
optimizations, namely influence analysis and monotonic-
ity, to further cut the average bisection depths.
(1) Influence analysis. When deciding which input
intervals to bisect first, instead of following a random
strategy, we compute the gradient or Jacobian of the out-
put with respect to each input feature and pick the largest
one as the first to bisect. The high-level intuition is that
the gradient approximates the influence of the input on
the output, which essentially measures the sensitivity of
the output to each input feature.
Algorithm 2 shows the steps for backward computation
of the input feature influence. Note that instead of work-
ing on concrete values, this version works with intervals.
The basic idea is to approximate the influence caused
by ReLUs. If there is no ReLU in the target DNN, the
Figure 5: A bisection tree with split depth of n. Each
node represents a bisected sub-interval.
Algorithm 2 Backward propagation for gradient interval
Inputs: network← tested neural network
R← gradient mask
1: // initialize upper and lower gradient bounds
2: gup = glow = weights[lastLayer];
3: for layer = numlayer-1 to 1 do
4: for 1 to layerSize[layer] do
5: // g is an interval containing gup and glow
6: // interval hadamard product
7: g=R[layer]
⊗
g;
8: // interval matrix multiplication
9: g=weights[layer]
⊙
g;
10: return g;
Jacobian matrix is completely determined by the weight
parameters, which is independent of the input. A ReLU
node’s gradient can either be 0 for negative input or 1 for
positive input. We use intervals to track and propagate
the bounds on the gradients of the ReLU nodes during
backward propagation as shown in Algorithm 2.
We further use the estimated gradient interval to com-
pute the smear function for an input feature [26, 27]:
Si(X) =max1≤ j≤d |Ji j|w(X j), where Ji j denotes the gradi-
ent of input X j for output Yi. For each refinement step, we
bisect the X j with the highest smear value to reduce the
over-approximation error as shown in Algorithm 3.
(2) Monotonicity. Computing the Jacobian matrix also
helps us to reason about the monotonicity property of
the output for a given input interval. In particular, for
the cases where the partial derivative of ∂Fi∂X j is always
positive or negative for the given input interval X , we can
simply replace the interval X j with two concrete values X j
and X j. Because, as the DNN output is monotonic in that
input interval, it is impossible for any intermediate value
to cause a violation without either X j or X j causing one.
Algorithm 3 Using influence analysis to choose the most
influential feature to split
Inputs: network← tested neural network
input← input interval
g← gradient interval calculated by backward propagation
1: for i = 1 to input.length do
2: // r is the range of each input interval
3: r = w(input[i]);
4: // e is the influence from each input to output
5: e = gup[i]∗ r;
6: if e > largest then . most effective feature
7: largest = e;
8: splitFeature = i;
9: return splitFeature;
Our empirical results in Section 7 also indicate that such
monotonicity checking can help decrease the number of
splits required for checking different security properties.
6 Implementation
Setup. We implement ReluVal in C and leverage
OpenBLAS1 to enable efficient matrix multiplications. We
evaluate ReluVal on a Linux server running Ubuntu 16.04
with 16 CPU cores and 256GB memory.
Parallelization. One unique advantage of ReluVal over
other security property checking systems like Reluplex
is that the interval arithmetic in the setting of verifying
DNNs is highly parallelizable by nature. During the pro-
cess of iterative interval refinement, newly created input
ranges can be checked independently. This feature allows
us to create as many threads as possible, each taking care
of a specific input range, to gain significant speedup by
distributing different input ranges to different workers.
However, there are two key challenges that required
solving to fully leverage the benefits of parallelization.
First, as shown in Section 5.2, the bisection tree is often
not balanced leading to substantially different running
times for different threads. We found that often several
laggard threads slow down the computation, i.e., most of
the available workers stay idle while only a few workers
keep on refining the intervals. Second, as it is hard to
predict the depth of the bisection tree for any sub-interval
in advance, starting a new thread for each sub-interval
may result in high scheduling overhead. To solve these
two problems, we develop a dynamic thread rebalancing
algorithm that can identify the potentially deeper parts of
the bisection tree and efficiently redistribute those parts
among other workers.
Outward rounding. The large number of floating ma-
trix multiplications in a DNN can potentially lead to se-
vere precision drops after rounding [15]. For example,
assume that the output of one neuron is [0.00000001,
1http://www.openblas.net/
0.00000002]. If the floating-point precision is e−7, then
it is automatically rounded up to [0.0,0.0]. After one
layer propagation with a weight parameter of 1000, the
correct output should be [0.00001, 0.00002]. However,
after rounding, the output will incorrectly become [0.0,
0.0]. As the interval propagates through the neural net-
work, more errors will accumulate and significantly affect
the output precision. In fact, our tests show that some
adversarial examples reported by Reluplex [25] are false
positives due to such rounding problem.
To avoid such issues, we adopt outward rounding in
ReluVal. In particular, for every newly calculated interval
or symbolic interval, we always round the bounds outward
to ensure the computed output range is always a sound
overestimation of the true output range. We implement
outward rounding with 32-bit floats. We find that this
precision is enough for verifying properties of ACAS Xu
models, though it can easily be extended to 64-bit double.
7 Evaluation
7.1 Evaluation Setup
In the evaluation, we consider two general categories of
DNNs, deployed for handling two different tasks.
The first category is airborne collision avoidance sys-
tem (ACAS) crucial for alerting and preventing the col-
lisions between aircraft. We focus our evaluation on
ACAS Xu models for collision avoidance in unmanned
aircraft [28].
The second category includes the models deployed to
recognize hand-written digit from the MNIST dataset.
Our preliminary results demonstrate that ReluVal can also
scale to larger networks that the solver-based verification
tools often struggle to check.
ACAS Xu. The ACAS Xu system consists of forty-five
different NN models. Each network is composed of an
input layer taking five inputs, an output layer generating
five outputs, and six hidden layers with each containing
fifty neurons. As shown in Figure 6, five inputs include
{ρ,θ ,ψ,vown,vint}. In particular, ρ denotes the distance
between ownship and intruder, θ denotes the heading
direction angle of ownship relative to the intruder, ψ
denotes the heading direction angle of the intruder relative
to ownship, vown is the speed of ownship, and vint is the
speed of intruder. Output of the NN includes {COC, weak
left, weak right, strong left, strong right}. COC denotes
clear of conflict, weak left means heading left with angle
1.5o/s, weak right means heading right with angle 1.5o/s,
strong left is heading left with angle 3.0o/s, and strong
right denotes heading right with angle 3.0o/s. Each output
in NN corresponds to the score for this action (minimal
for the best).
MNIST. For classifying hand-written digits, we test a
Figure 6: Horizontal view of ACAS Xu operating scenarios.
neural network with 784 inputs, 10 outputs, and two hid-
den layers. Each intermediate layer has 512 neurons. On
the MNIST test dataset, it can achieve 98.28% accuracy
for classification.
7.2 Performance on ACAS Xu Models
In this section, we first present a detailed comparison of
ReluVal and Reluplex in terms of the verification perfor-
mance. Then, we compare ReluVal with a state-of-the-art
adversarial attack on DNNs, Carlini-Wagner [7], showing
that on average ReluVal can consistently find 50% more
adversarial examples. Finally, we show that ReluVal can
accurately narrow down all possible adversarial ranges
and therefore provide more insights on the distribution of
adversarial corner-cases.
Comparison to Reluplex. Table 1 compares the time
taken by ReluVal with that of Reluplex for verifying ten
original properties described in their paper [25]. In ad-
dition, we include the experimental results for five new
security properties. The detailed description of each prop-
erty is in the Appendix. Table 1 shows that ReluVal
always outperforms Reluplex at checking all fifteen se-
curity properties. For the properties on which Reluplex
times out, ReluVal is able to terminate in significantly
shorter time. On average, ReluVal achieves up to 200×
speedup over Reluplex.
Finding adversarial inputs. In terms of the number of
adversarial examples detected, ReluVal also outperforms
the popular attacks using gradients to find adversarial
examples. Here, we compare ReluVal to the Carlini and
Wagner (CW) attack [7], a state-of-the-art gradient-based
attack that minimizes specialized CW loss function.
As gradient-based attacks start from a seed input and
iteratively looking for adversarial examples, the choice
of seeds may highly influence the success of the attack
at finding adversarial inputs. Therefore, we try differ-
ent randomly picked seed inputs to facilitate the input
generation process. Note that our technique in ReluVal
does not need any seed input. Thus it is not restricted
Source Properties Networks Reluplex Time (sec) ReluVal Time (sec) Speedup
Security
Properties
from [25]
φ1 45 >443,560.73* 14,603.27 >30×
φ2 34∗2 123,420.40 117,243.26 1×
φ3 42 35,040.28 19,018.90 2×
φ4 42 13,919.51 441.97 32×
φ5 1 23,212.52 216.88 107×
φ6 1 220,330.82 46.59 4729×
φ7 1 >86400.0* 9,240.29 >9×
φ8 1 43,200.01 40.41 1069×
φ9 1 116,441.97 15,639.52 7×
φ10 1 23,683.07 10.94 2165×
Additional
Security
Properties
φ11 1 4,394.91 27.89 158×
φ12 1 2,556.28 0.104 24580×
φ13 1 >172,800.0* 148.21 >1166×
φ14 2 >172,810.86* 288.98 >598×
φ15 2 31,328.26 876.80 36×
* Reluplex uses different timeout thresholds for different properties.
Table 1: ReluVal’s performance at verifying properties of ACAS Xu compared with Reluplex. φ1 to φ10 are the
properties proposed in Reluplex [25]. φ11 to φ15 are our additional properties.
# Seeds CW CW Miss ReluVal ReluVal Miss
50 24/40 40.0% 40/40 0%
40 21/40 47.5% 40/40 0%
30 17/40 58.5% 40/40 0%
20 10/40 75.0% 40/40 0%
10 6/40 85.0% 40/40 0%
Table 2: The number of adversarial inputs CW can find
compared to ReluVal on 40 adversarial ACAS Xu proper-
ties. The third column shows the percentage of adversarial
properties CW failed to find.
by the potentially undesired starting seed and can fully
explore the input space. As shown in Table 2, on aver-
age, CW misses 61.2% number of models, which do have
adversarial inputs exist that CW fails to find.
Narrowing down adversarial ranges. A unique fea-
ture of ReluVal is that it can isolate adversarial ranges
of inputs from the non-adversarial ones. This is use-
ful because it allows a DNN designer to potentially iso-
late and avoid adversarial ranges with a given precision
(e.g., e− 6 or smaller). Here we set the precision to be
e−6, i.e., we allow splitting of the intervals into smaller
sub-intervals unless their length becomes less than e−6.
Table 3 shows the results of the three different proper-
ties that we checked. For example, property S1 specifies
model_4_1 should output strong right with input range
ρ = [400,10000], θ = 0.2, ψ = −3.09, vown = 10, and
vint = 10. For this property, ReluVal splits the input ranges
into 262,144 smaller sub-intervals and is able to prove
that 163,915 sub-intervals are safe. ReluVal also finds
that ρ = [400,6402.36] does not contain any adversarial
inputs while ρ = [6402.36,10000] is adversarial.
P Adv Range Adv Timeout Non-adv
S1 [6402.36,10000] 98229 1 163915
S2 [−0.2,−0.186] and [−0.103,0] 18121 2 14645
S3 [−0.1,0.0085] 17738 1 15029
Table 3: The second column shows the input ranges con-
taining at least one adversarial input, while the rest of
ranges are found by ReluVal to be non-adversarial. The
last three columns show the number of total sub-intervals
checked by ReluVal with a precision of e−6.
7.3 Preliminary Tests on MNIST Model
Besides ACAS Xu, we also test ReluVal on an MNIST
model that achieves decent accuracy (98.28%). Given a
particular seed image, we allow arbitrary perturbations to
every pixel value while bounding the total perturbation
by the L∞ norm. In particular, ReluVal can prove 956
seed images to be safe for |X |∞ ≤ 1 and 721 images safe
for |X |∞ ≤ 2 respectively out of 1000 randomly selected
test images. Figure 7 shows the detailed results. As the
norm is increased, the percentage of images that have
no adversarial perturbations drops quickly to 0. Note
that we get more timeouts as the L∞ norm increase. We
believe that we can further optimize our system to work
on GPUs to minimize such timeouts and verify properties
with larger norm bounds.
2We remove model_4_2 and model_5_3 because Reluplex found
incorrect adversarial examples due to rounding problems (these models
do not have any adversarial case).
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Figure 7: Percentage of images proved to be non-
adversarial with L∞ = 1,2,3,4,5 by ReluVal on MNIST
test model out of 1000 random test MNIST images.
7.4 Optimizations
In this subsection, we evaluate the effectiveness of the
optimizations proposed in Section 5 compared to the naive
interval extension with iterative interval refinement. The
results are shown in Table 4.
Methods Deepest Dep (%) Avg Dep (%) Time (%)
S.C.P 42.06 49.28 99.99
I.A. 10.65 10.85 96.04
Mono 0.325 0.497 16.91
Table 4: The percentages of the deepest depth, average
depth, and average running time improvement caused by
the three main components of ReluVal: symbolic interval
analysis, influence analysis, and monotonicity compared
to the naive interval analysis.
Symbolic interval propagation. Table 4 shows that sym-
bolic interval analysis saves the deepest and average depth
of bisection tree (Figure 5) by up to 42.06% and 49.28%,
respectively, over naive interval extension.
Influence analysis. As one of the optimizations used
in iterative refinement, influence analysis helps priori-
tize splitting of the most influential input to the output.
Compared to the sequential splitting features, influence-
analysis-based splitting reduces the average depth by
10.85% and thus cut down the running time by up to
96.04%.
Monotonocity. The improvements from using mono-
tonicity are relatively smaller in terms of tree depth.
However, it can still reduce the average running time
by 16.91% on average, especially when the average depth
is high.
8 Related Work
Adversarial machine learning. Several recent works
have shown that even the state-of-the-art DNNs can be
easily fooled by adding small carefully crafted human-
imperceptible perturbations to the original inputs [7, 16,
37, 48]. This has resulted in an arms race among re-
searchers competing to build more robust networks and
design more efficient attacks [7, 16, 31, 32, 39, 41, 51].
However, most of the defenses are restricted to only one
type of adversaries/security properties (e.g., overall per-
turbations bounded by some norms) even though other
researchers have shown that other semantics-preserving
changes like lightning changes, small occlusions, rota-
tions, etc. can also easily fool the DNNs [13, 42, 43, 49].
However, none of these attacks can provide any prov-
able guarantees about the non-existence of adversarial
examples for a given neural network. Unlike these at-
tacks, ReluVal can provide a provable security analysis of
given input ranges, systematically narrowing down and
detecting all adversarial ranges.
Verification of machine learning systems. Recently,
several projects [12, 21, 25] have used customized SMT
solvers for verifying security properties of DNNs. How-
ever, such techniques are mostly limited by the scalability
of the solver. Therefore, they tend to incur significant
overhead [25] or only provide weaker guarantees [21].
By contrast, ReluVal uses interval-based techniques and
significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art solver-based
systems like Reluplex [25].
Kolter et al. [29] and Raghunathan et al. [44] trans-
form the verification problem into a convex optimization
problem using relaxations to over-approximate the out-
puts of ReLU nodes. Similarly, Gehr et al. [14] leverages
zonotopes for approximating each ReLU outputs. Dvi-
jotham et al. [11] transform the verification problem into
an unconstrained dual formulation using Lagrange relax-
ation and use gradient-descent to solve the optimization
problem. However, all of these works focus on simply
over-approximating the total number of potential adver-
sarial violations without trying to find concrete counterex-
amples. Therefore, they tend to suffer from high false
positive rates unless the underlying DNN’s training al-
gorithm is modified to minimize such violations. By
contrast, ReluVal can find concrete counterexamples as
well as verify security properties of pre-trained DNNs.
Recently, Mixed Integer Linear programming (MILP)
solvers combined with gradient descent have also been
proposed for verification of DNNs [9, 10]. Integrating
our interval analysis together with such approaches is an
interesting future research problem.
Verivis [43] by Pei et al. is a black-box DNN verifica-
tion system that leverages the discreteness of image pixels.
However, unlike ReluVal, it cannot verify non-existence
of norm-based adversarial examples.
Interval optimization. Interval analysis has shown great
success in many application domains including non-
linear equation solving and global optimization prob-
lems [23, 34, 35]. Due to its ability to provide rigorous
bounds on the solutions of an equation, many numerical
optimization problems [22,50] leveraged interval analysis
to achieve a near-precise approximation of the solutions.
We note that the computation inside NN is mostly a se-
quence of simple linear transformations with nonlinear
activation functions. These computations thus highly
resemble those in traditional domains where interval anal-
ysis has been shown to be successful. Therefore, based
on the foundation of interval analysis laid by Moore et
al. [36, 45], we leverage interval analysis for analyzing
the security properties of DNNs.
9 Future Work and Discussion
Supporting other activation functions. Interval exten-
sion can, in theory, be applied to any activation function
that maintains inclusion isotonicity and Lipschitz conti-
nuity. As mentioned in Section 4, most popular activation
functions (e.g., tanh, sigmoid) satisfy these properties.
To support these activation functions, we need to adapt
the symbolic interval propagation process. We plan to
explore this as part of future work. Our current prototype
implementation of symbolic interval propagation supports
several common piece-wise linear activation functions
(e.g., regular ReLU, Leaky ReLU, and PReLU).
Supporting other norms besides L∞. While interval
arithmetic is most immediately applicable to L∞, other
norms (e.g., L2 and L1) can also be approximated using
intervals. Essentially, L∞ allows the most flexible pertur-
bations and the perturbations bounded by other norms like
L2 are all subsets of those allowed by the corresponding
L∞ bound. Therefore, if ReluVal can verify the absence of
adversarial examples for a DNN within an infinite norm
bound, the DNN is also guaranteed to be safe for the corre-
sponding p-norm (p=1/2/3..) bound. If ReluVal identifies
adversarial subintervals for an infinite norm bound, we
can iteratively check whether any such subinterval lies
within the corresponding p-norm bound. If not, we can
declare the model to contain no adversarial examples for
the given p-norm bound. We plan to explore this direction
in future.
Improving DNN Robustness. The counterexamples
found by ReluVal can be used to increase the robustness
of a DNN through adversarial training. Specific, we can
add the adversarial examples detected by ReluVal to the
training dataset and retrain the model. Also, a DNN’s
training process can further be changed to incorporate
ReluVal’s interval analysis for improved robustness. In-
stead of training on individual samples, we can convert
the training samples into intervals and change the training
process to minimize losses for these intervals instead of
individual samples. We plan to pursue this direction as
future work.
10 Conclusion
Although this paper focuses on verifying security proper-
ties of DNNs, ReluVal itself is a generic framework that
can efficiently leverage interval analysis to understand
and analyze the DNN computation. In the future, we
hope to develop a full-fledged DNN security analysis tool
based on ReluVal, just like traditional program analysis
tools, that can not only efficiently check arbitrary security
properties of DNNs but can also provide insights into the
behaviors of hidden neurons with rigorous guarantees.
In this paper, we designed, developed, and evaluated
ReluVal, a formal security analysis system for neural net-
works. We introduced several novel techniques including
symbolic interval arithmetic to perform formal analysis
without resorting to SMT solvers. ReluVal performed
200 times faster on average than the current state-of-art
solver-based approaches.
11 Acknowledgements
We thank Chandrika Bhardwaj, Andrew Aday, and the
anonymous reviewers for their constructive and valu-
able feedback. This work is sponsored in part by NSF
grants CNS-16-17670, CNS-15-63843, and CNS-15-
64055; ONR grants N00014-17-1-2010, N00014-16-1-
2263, and N00014-17-1-2788; and a Google Faculty Fel-
lowship. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recom-
mendations expressed herein are those of the authors, and
do not necessarily reflect those of the US Government,
ONR, or NSF.
References
[1] Baidu Apollo Autonomous Driving Platform. https://
github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo.
[2] NASA, FAA, Industry Conduct Initial Sense-and-Avoid
Test. https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/
Features/acas_xu_paves_the_way.html.
[3] NAVAIR Plans to Install ACAS Xu on MQ-4C Fleet.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/
navair-plans-to-install-acas-xu-on-mq-4c-
fleet-444989/.
[4] T. Ball and S. K. Rajamani. The SLAM project: debugging
system software via static analysis. In ACM SIGPLAN
Notices, volume 37, pages 1–3. ACM, 2002.
[5] C. Bloom, J. Tan, J. Ramjohn, and L. Bauer. Self-driving
cars and data collection: Privacy perceptions of networked
autonomous vehicles. In Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security (SOUPS), 2017.
[6] N. Carlini, G. Katz, C. Barrett, and D. L. Dill. Provably
minimally-distorted adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.10207, 2017.
[7] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robust-
ness of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[8] L. H. De Figueiredo and J. Stolfi. Affine arithmetic: con-
cepts and applications. Numerical Algorithms, 37(1):147–
158, 2004.
[9] S. Dutta, S. Jha, S. Sankaranarayanan, and A. Tiwari.
Learning and verification of feedback control systems us-
ing feedforward neural networks. In IFAC Conference on
Analysis and Design of Hybrid Systems (ADHS), 2018.
[10] S. Dutta, S. Jha, S. Sankaranarayanan, and A. Tiwari. Out-
put range analysis for deep feedforward neural networks.
In NASA Formal Methods Symposium, pages 121–138.
Springer, 2018.
[11] K. Dvijotham, R. Stanforth, S. Gowal, T. Mann, and
P. Kohli. A dual approach to scalable verification of deep
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.06567, 2018.
[12] R. Ehlers. Formal verification of piece-wise linear feed-
forward neural networks. In International Symposium
on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
(ATVA), pages 269–286. Springer, 2017.
[13] L. Engstrom, D. Tsipras, L. Schmidt, and A. Madry. A
rotation and a translation suffice: Fooling cnns with simple
transformations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.02779, 2017.
[14] T. Gehr, M. Mirman, D. Drachsler-Cohen, P. Tsankov,
S. Chaudhuri, and M. Vechev. AI2: Safety and robustness
certification of neural networks with abstract interpretation.
In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2018.
[15] D. Goldberg. What every computer scientist should know
about floating-point arithmetic. ACM Computing Surveys
(CSUR), 23(1):5–48, 1991.
[16] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining
and harnessing adversarial examples. In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[17] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual
learning for image recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), pages 770–778, 2016.
[18] T. A. Henzinger, R. Jhala, R. Majumdar, and G. Sutre.
Lazy abstraction. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 37(1):58–70,
2002.
[19] G. Hinton, L. Deng, D. Yu, G. E. Dahl, A.-r. Mohamed,
N. Jaitly, A. Senior, V. Vanhoucke, P. Nguyen, T. N.
Sainath, et al. Deep neural networks for acoustic modeling
in speech recognition: The shared views of four research
groups. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 29(6):82–97,
2012.
[20] G. Huang, Z. Liu, K. Q. Weinberger, and L. van der
Maaten. Densely connected convolutional networks. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), volume 1, page 3, 2017.
[21] X. Huang, M. Kwiatkowska, S. Wang, and M. Wu. Safety
verification of deep neural networks. In International
Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV), pages
3–29. Springer, 2017.
[22] D. Ishii, K. Yoshizoe, and T. Suzumura. Scalable parallel
numerical constraint solver using global load balancing.
In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on X10,
pages 33–38. ACM, 2015.
[23] L. Jaulin and E. Walter. Guaranteed nonlinear parameter
estimation from bounded-error data via interval analysis.
Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 35(2):123–
137, 1993.
[24] K. D. Julian, J. Lopez, J. S. Brush, M. P. Owen, and M. J.
Kochenderfer. Policy compression for aircraft collision
avoidance systems. In Digital Avionics Systems Confer-
ence (DASC), 2016 IEEE/AIAA 35th, pages 1–10. IEEE,
2016.
[25] G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. L. Dill, K. Julian, and M. J. Kochen-
derfer. Reluplex: An efficient smt solver for verifying deep
neural networks. In International Conference on Computer
Aided Verification (CAV), pages 97–117. Springer, 2017.
[26] R. B. Kearfott. Rigorous global search: continuous prob-
lems, volume 13. Springer Science & Business Media,
2013.
[27] R. B. Kearfott and M. Novoa III. Algorithm 681: Intbis, a
portable interval newton/bisection package. ACM Transac-
tions on Mathematical Software (TOMS), 16(2):152–157,
1990.
[28] M. J. Kochenderfer, J. E. Holland, and J. P. Chryssan-
thacopoulos. Next-generation airborne collision avoid-
ance system. Technical report, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology-Lincoln Laboratory Lexington United States,
2012.
[29] J. Z. Kolter and E. Wong. Provable defenses against adver-
sarial examples via the convex outer adversarial polytope.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.00851, 2017.
[30] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton. Imagenet
classification with deep convolutional neural networks.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
(NIPS), pages 1097–1105, 2012.
[31] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial
machine learning at scale. In International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2017.
[32] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song. Delving into trans-
ferable adversarial examples and black-box attacks. In
International Conference on Learning Representations
(ICLR), 2016.
[33] M. Marston and G. Baca. ACAS-Xu initial self-separation
flight tests. NASA Technical Reports Server, 2015.
[34] R. Moore and W. Lodwick. Interval analysis and fuzzy set
theory. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 135(1):5–9, 2003.
[35] R. E. Moore. Interval arithmetic and automatic error anal-
ysis in digital computing. Technical report, Applied Math-
ematics and Statistics Laboratories Technical Report No.
25, Stanford University, 1962.
[36] R. E. Moore. Methods And Applications Of Interval Anal-
ysis, volume 2. Siam, 1979.
[37] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deep-
fool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural
networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), pages
2574–2582, 2016.
[38] V. Nair and G. E. Hinton. Rectified linear units improve
restricted boltzmann machines. In Proceedings of the 27th
International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML),
pages 807–814, 2010.
[39] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune. Deep neural net-
works are easily fooled: High confidence predictions
for unrecognizable images. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), pages 427–436, 2015.
[40] M. T. Notes. Airborne Collision Avoidance System X.
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 2015.
[41] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B.
Celik, and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against
machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, pages 506–519. ACM, 2017.
[42] K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana. Deepxplore: Au-
tomated whitebox testing of deep learning systems. In
Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles (SOSP), pages 1–18. ACM, 2017.
[43] K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana. Towards practical
verification of machine learning: The case of computer
vision systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.01785, 2017.
[44] A. Raghunathan, J. Steinhardt, and P. Liang. Certified
defenses against adversarial examples. In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018.
[45] M. J. C. Ramon E. Moore, R. Baker Kearfott. Introduction
to Interval Analysis. SIAM, 2009.
[46] D. Silver, J. Schrittwieser, K. Simonyan, I. Antonoglou,
A. Huang, A. Guez, T. Hubert, L. Baker, M. Lai, A. Bolton,
et al. Mastering the game of go without human knowledge.
Nature, 550(7676):354, 2017.
[47] C. Szegedy, V. Vanhoucke, S. Ioffe, J. Shlens, and Z. Wo-
jna. Rethinking the inception architecture for computer vi-
sion. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), pages 2818–2826,
2016.
[48] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of
neural networks. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2014.
[49] Y. Tian, K. Pei, S. Jana, and B. Ray. DeepTest: Automated
testing of deep-neural-network-driven autonomous cars.
In Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on
Software Engineering (ICSE), 2018.
[50] R. Vaidyanathan and M. El-Halwagi. Global optimiza-
tion of nonconvex nonlinear programs via interval analy-
sis. Computers & Chemical Engineering, 18(10):889–897,
1994.
[51] W. Xu, Y. Qi, and D. Evans. Automatically evading classi-
fiers. In Proceedings of Network and Distributed Systems
Symposium (NDSS), 2016.
A Appendix: Formal Definitions for ACAS
Xu Properties φ1 to φ15
Inputs. Inputs for each ACAS Xu DNN model are:
ρ: the distance between ownship and intruder;
θ : the heading direction angle of ownship relative to intruder;
ψ: heading direction angle of intruder relative to ownship;
vown: speed of ownshipe;
vint : speed of intruder;
Outputs. Outputs for each ACAS Xu DNN model are:
COC: Clear of Conflict;
weak left: heading left with angle 1.5o/s;
weak right: heading right with angle 1.5o/s;
strong left: heading left with angle 3.0o/s;
strong right: heading right with angle 3.0o/s.
45 Models. There are 45 different models indexed by two extra
inputs aprev and τ , model_x_y means the model used when
aprev = x and τ = y :
aprev: previous action indexed as {COC, weak left, weak
right, strong left, strong right}.
τ: time until loss of vertical separation indexed as {0, 1, 5,
10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100}
Property φ1: If the intruder is distant and is significantly slower
than the ownship, the score of a COC advisory will always be
below a certain fixed threshold.
Tested on: all 45 networks.
Input ranges: ρ ≥ 55947.691, vown ≥ 1145, vint ≤ 60.
Desired output: the output of COC is at most 1500.
Property φ2: If the intruder is distant and is significantly slower
than the ownship, the score of a COC advisory will never be
maximal.
Tested on: model_x_y, x ≥ 2, except model_5_3 and
model_4_2
Input ranges: ρ ≥ 55947.691, vown ≥ 1145, vint ≤ 60.
Desired output: the score for COC is not the maximal score.
Property φ3: If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving
towards the ownship, the score for COC will not be minimal.
Tested on: all models except model_1_7, model_1_8 and
model_1_9
Input ranges: 1500 ≤ ρ ≤ 1800, −0.06 ≤ θ ≤ 0.06, ψ ≥
3.10, vown ≥ 980, vint ≥ 960.
Desired output: the score for COC is not the minimal score.
Property φ4: If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving
away from the ownship but at a lower speed than that of the
ownship, the score for COC will not be minimal.
Tested on: all models except model_1_7, model_1_8 and
model_1_9
Input ranges: 1500≤ ρ ≤ 1800, −0.06≤ θ ≤ 0.06, ψ = 0,
vown ≥ 1000, 700≤ vint ≤ 800.
Desired output: the score for COC is not the minimal score.
Property φ5: If the intruder is near and approaching from the
left, the network advises âA˘IJstrong rightâA˘I˙.
Tested on: model_1_1
Input ranges: 250≤ ρ ≤ 400, 0.2≤ θ ≤ 0.4, −3.141592≤
ψ ≤−3.141592+0.005, 100≤ vown ≤ 400, 0≤ vint ≤ 400.
Desired output: the score for “strong right” is the minimal
score.
Property φ6: If the intruder is sufficiently far away, the network
advises COC.
Tested on: model_1_1
Input ranges: 12000≤ ρ ≤ 62000, (0.7≤ θ ≤ 3.141592)∪
(−3.141592 ≤ θ ≤ −0.7), −3.141592 ≤ ψ ≤ −3.141592+
0.005, 100≤ vown ≤ 1200, 0≤ vint ≤ 1200.
Desired output: the score for COC is the minimal score.
Property φ7: If vertical separation is large, the network will
never advise a strong turn
Tested on: model_1_9
Input ranges: 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 60760, −3.141592 ≤ θ ≤ 3.141592,
−3.141592 ≤ ψ ≤ 3.141592, 100 ≤ vown ≤ 1200, 0 ≤ vint ≤
1200.
Desired output: the scores for “strong right” and “strong left”
are never the minimal scores.
Property φ8: For a large vertical separation and a previous
“weak left” advisory, the network will either output COC or
continue advising “weak left.”
Tested on: model_2_9
Input ranges: 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 60760, −3.141592 ≤ θ ≤ −0.75 ·
3.141592, −0.1 ≤ ψ ≤ 0.1, 600 ≤ vown ≤ 1200, 600 ≤ vint ≤
1200.
Desired output: the score for “weak left” is minimal or the
score for COC is minimal.
Property φ9: Even if the previous advisory was “weak right,”
the presence of a nearby intruder will cause the network to
output a “strong left” advisory instead.
Tested on: model_3_3
Input ranges: 2000 ≤ ρ ≤ 7000, 0.7 ≤ θ ≤ 3.141592,
−3.141592 ≤ ψ ≤ −3.141592+0.01, 100 ≤ vown ≤ 150, 0 ≤
vint ≤ 150.
Desired output: the score for “strong left” is minimal.
Property φ10: For a far away intruder, the network advises COC.
Tested on: model_4_5
Input ranges: 36000 ≤ ρ ≤ 60760, 0.7 ≤ θ ≤ 3.141592,
−3.141592 ≤ ψ ≤ −3.141592 + 0.01, 900 ≤ vown ≤ 1200,
600≤ vint ≤ 1200.
Desired output: the score for COC is minimal.
Property φ11: If the intruder is near and approaching from the
left but the vertical separation is comparably large, the network
still tend to advise “strong right” more than COC.
Tested on: model_1_1
Input ranges: 250≤ ρ ≤ 400, 0.2≤ θ ≤ 0.4, −3.141592≤
ψ ≤−3.141592+0.005, 100≤ vown ≤ 400, 0≤ vint ≤ 400.
Desired output: the score for “strong right” is always smaller
than COC.
Property φ12: If the intruder is distant and is significantly slower
than the ownship, the score of a COC advisory will be the
minimal.
Tested on: model_3_3
Input ranges: ρ ≥ 55947.691, vown ≥ 1145, vint ≤ 60.
Desired output: the score for COC is the minimal score.
Property φ13: For a far away intruder but the vertical distance
are small, the network always advises COC no matter the direc-
tions are.
Tested on: model_1_1
Input ranges: 60000 ≤ ρ ≤ 60760, −3.141592 ≤ θ ≤
3.141592, −3.141592 ≤ ψ ≤ 3.141592, 0 ≤ vown ≤ 360, 0 ≤
vint ≤ 360.
Desired output: the score for COC is the minimal.
Property φ14: If the intruder is near and approaching from the
left and vertical distance is small, the network always advises
strong right no matter previous action is strong right or strong
left.
Tested on: model_4_1, model_5_1
Input ranges: 250≤ ρ ≤ 400, 0.2≤ θ ≤ 0.4, −3.141592≤
ψ ≤−3.141592+0.005, 100≤ vown ≤ 400, 0≤ vint ≤ 400.
Desired output: the score for “strong right” is always the
minimal.
Property φ15: If the intruder is near and approaching from the
right and vertical distance is small, the network always advises
strong left no matter previous action is strong right or strong
left.
Tested on: model_4_1, model_5_1
Input ranges: 250 ≤ ρ ≤ 400, −0.4 ≤ θ ≤ −0.2,
−3.141592 ≤ ψ ≤ −3.141592 + 0.005, 100 ≤ vown ≤ 400,
0≤ vint ≤ 400.
Desired output: the score for “strong left” is always the
minimal.
Property S1:
Tested on: model_4_1
Input ranges: 400≤ ρ ≤ 10000, θ = 0.2, ψ =−3.141592+
0.005, vown = 10, vint = 10.
Desired output: the score for “strong right” is the minimal.
Property S2:
Tested on: model_4_1
Input ranges: ρ = 400, −0.2 ≤ θ ≤ 0, ψ = −3.141592+
0.005, vown = 1000, vint = 1000.
Desired output: the score for “strong right” is the minimal.
Property S3:
Tested on: model_1_2
Input ranges: ρ = 400, −0.1 ≤ θ ≤ 0.1, ψ = −3.141592,
vown = 500, vint = 600.
Desired output: the score for “strong right” is the minimal.
